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Reviewing the EU’s Market Abuse Rules 
Carmine Di Noia 
Abstract 
In  2011,  an  EU  legislative  package  on  market  abuse was  proposed,  which  comprises  two  sets  of  documents:  1)  a  draft 
Regulation that will largely replace the existing Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and the level 2 measures; and a new Directive 
dealing with criminal sanctions. Market abuse rules are needed to ensure market integrity and investor confidence, and to 
allow companies to raise capital and contribute to economic growth, thereby increasing employment. This ECMI Policy Brief 
argues that rules on market abuse should be technically well designed, proportionate and crystal clear, but also subject to more 
efficient  and  harmonised  supervision  than  before.  The  paper  focuses  particularly  on  the  draft  Regulation.  The  use  of  a 
regulation is welcome, as (in integrated financial markets) abuses should be regulated in a harmonised manner by member 
states, which has not always been the case, as the 2007 report from the European Securities Markets Expert (ESME) Group 
extensively demonstrated. 
At the same time, this paper criticises some of the provisions contained in the draft Regulation, notably the new notion of inside 
information not to abuse (Art. 6(e)) and the unchanged definition of inside information for listed companies to disclose, and it 
proposes new definitions. The extension of disclosure obligations to issuers whose shares are traded on demand only on 
‘listing’ multilateral trading facilities is also widely criticised. Other comments deal with the proposed rules on managers’ 
transactions, insiders’ lists and accepted market practices. 
 
Introduction 
Market  abuse  rules  are  needed  to  ensure  market  integrity 
and investor confidence, to allow companies to raise capital 
and  contribute  to  economic  growth,  thereby  increasing 
employment.  Rules  in  place  are  a  necessary  but  not 
sufficient condition for market integrity. 
On the one hand, they need to be technically well designed, 
proportionate and crystal clear, avoiding uncertainties in the 
interpretation,  especially  when  there  are,  correctly,  tough 
sanctions.  On  the  other  hand,  regulation  needs  to  be 
complemented  by  efficient  supervision.  In  integrated 
financial  markets,  abuses  should  be  regulated  in  a 
harmonised  manner  by  member  states  and  timely 
cooperation  is  therefore  necessary  among  the  national 
competent authorities, which has not always been the case. 
This  paper  initially  concentrates  on  the  scope  and 
definitions  –  particularly  the  definitions  of  insider 
information, insider dealing and market manipulation – and 
the listed companies’ disclosure  obligations, including the 
specific provisions for SMEs. Many proposals are rooted in 
the 2007 report by the European Securities Markets Expert 
(ESME) Group.
1 
As the ESME report illustrated, the existing framework of 
the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) (2003/6/EC)
2 has been 
implemented in many different ways in Europe, despite the 
                                                        
1  See  the  report  by  the  European  Securities  Markets  Expert 
Group  (ESME),  Market  abuse  EU  legal  framework  and  its 
implementation  by  Member  States,  Brussels,  6  July  2007 
(hereinafter  ESME  report)  (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/securities/docs/esme/mad_070706_en.pdf). 
See  also  N.  Moloney,  EC  Securities  Regulation,  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008; J.L. Hansen and D. Moalem, 
“The MAD Disclosure Regime and the Two-Fold Notion of 
Inside Information – The Available Solution”, Capital Markets 
Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2009, p. 323 and C. Di Noia and 
M. Gargantini, “The Market Abuse Directive disclosure regime 
in  practice:  Some  margins  for  future  actions”,  Rivista  delle 
società, 4/2009. 
2  Directive 2003/6/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council  of  28  January  2003  on  insider  dealing  and  market 
manipulation (market abuse), OJ L 96/16, 12.4.2003.
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Lamfalussy  approach.  This  is  undesirable  even  if  it  has 
allowed  member  states  and  especially  their  competent 
authorities in the last decade to overcome the fatal flaws of 
the 2003 Directive. 
1.  The notion of inside information 
In 2003, MAD not only regulated market abuse but also fair 
disclosure obligations for listed companies: in particular, it 
provided for the public disclosure of inside information as 
soon as possible by making the same kind of information 
(inside  information)  the  basis  for  both  the  prohibition  of 
insider  trading  and  the  obligation  to  disclose.  This 
coincidence of notions generated a lot of legal uncertainty, 
especially  because  market  abuse  was  already  the  basis  in 
many member states for criminal offences. The possibility 
for listed companies to delay disclosure has been severely 
limited  by  the  condition  that  such  delay  should  not  be 
misleading. To solve that uncertainty, many member states 
simply did not apply the Directive or circumvented it with 
guidelines from their competent authorities, which proved to 
be valuable at first glance but often worthless when dealing 
with criminal charges. 
After  ten  years,  the  draft  Regulation  has  the  merit  of 
recognising that differentiation is needed and it goes back to 
distinguishing the information that cannot be abused from 
the information that listed companies have to disclose. 
But it does so in the wrong way: instead of clarifying the 
circumstances in  which listed companies  have to  disclose 
relevant facts that arise in their own sphere of activities or 
when delaying disclosure is possible, it enlarges the notion 
of inside information not to be abused by introducing a new 
Art. 6.1(e), which is relevant only for abuse purposes.
3 
This novelty, never put out for consultation by the European 
Commission, introduces a new case  of inside  information 
that lacks two criteria hitherto applied to the notion of inside 
information: the requirement  of being “precise” and price 
sensitivity.
4 While it is appropriate to consider market abuse 
                                                        
3  Inside  information  also  includes  “information  not  falling 
within [the previous paragraphs] relating to one or more issuers 
of financial instruments or to one or more financial instruments 
which is not generally available to the public, but which, if it 
were available to a reasonable investor, who regularly deals on 
the  market  and  in  the  financial  instrument  or  a related  spot 
commodity  contract  concerned,  would  be  regarded  by  that 
person  as  relevant  when  deciding  the  terms  on  which 
transactions  in  the  financial  instrument  or  a  related  spot 
commodity  contract  should  be  effected”.  See  European 
Commission,  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse), COM(2011) 651 final, Brussels, 
10 October 2011. 
4 Although price sensitivity seems to have been supplanted by a 
reasonable investor test (Art. 6.2). The proposed extension is 
an  adaptation  of  the  UK  concept  of  RINGA  (Relevant 
Information Not Generally Available), but without other limits 
(for example, that the information is considered relevant if it 
would be ordinarily the subject of an announcement required 
by  law  or  made  by  convention  –  see  section  1.5  of  the 
Financial Services Authority’s Code of Market Conduct). 
as  warranting  criminal  sanctions,  the  violation  should  be 
carefully described in detail, and not left to the excessive 
discretion  of  the  courts,  in  order  to  allow  citizens  to 
understand easily when they commit an abuse or not. 
The lack of certainty and the extension of the violation as a 
criminal sanction may lead financial intermediaries to limit 
sensibly  their  trades  and  reduce  liquidity  on  European 
stocks.  It  may  also  reduce  the  corporate  governance 
dialogue,  often  encouraged  by  European  institutions, 
between  companies  and  shareholders,  if  the  latter  feel 
restricted  in  their  ability  to  trade.  It  may  additionally 
severely limit the possibility for companies to act in general 
and  operate  with  respect  to  their  shares  (despite  the 
provision  of  Art.  3)  and  to  use  variable  compensation 
schemes  for  managers  instead  of  granting  only  fixed 
compensation, irrespective of the results of the companies.
5 
Two major changes are therefore necessary. The new Art. 
6.1(e) should be deleted. The disclosure obligation in Art. 
12  should  take  into  account  the  ‘old’  definition  of  inside 
information for disclosure duties of Directive 2001/34/EC.
6 
In any case the requirement for a listed company of “not 
misleading the public” when delaying disclosure of inside 
information – which is by definition impossible to comply 
with – should be modified to allow companies to disclose 
negotiations  only  when  they  have  a  sufficient  degree  of 
certainty, avoiding market manipulation.
7 
2.  Inside  information,  takeover  and  buying 
shares 
The  draft  Regulation  eliminates,  without  any  consultation 
by  the  European  Commission,  recitals  29  and  30  of  the 
MAD.
8 
                                                        
5 Managers may find it impossible to execute share options or 
even sell the stock grants of their company.  
6 “The company must inform the public as soon as possible of 
any major new developments in its sphere of activity which are 
not public knowledge and which may, by virtue of their effect 
on  its  assets  and  liabilities  or  financial  position  or  on  the 
general course of its business, lead to substantial movements in 
the prices of its shares” (Art. 68). See Directive 2001/34/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2001 on 
the  admission  of  securities  to  official  stock  exchange listing 
and on information to be published on those securities, OJ L 
184/1, 6.7.2001. 
7  See  the  ESME  Report  (2007,  op.  cit.)  for  more  detailed 
solutions  dealing  with  the  concept  of  precision.  Another 
possible option could be to limit the precision of Art. 6.2 in 
Art.  12,  making  reference  only  to  the  existing  set  of 
circumstances or events.  
8 Recital 29 stated that “having access to inside information 
relating to another company and using it in the context of a 
public takeover bid for the purpose of gaining control of that 
company or proposing a merger with that company should not 
in itself be deemed to constitute insider dealing”. Recital 30 
stated  that  “since  the  acquisition  or  disposal  of  financial 
instruments necessarily involves a prior decision to acquire or 
dispose taken by the person who undertakes one or other of 
these operations, the carrying out of this acquisition or disposal Some considerations on the review of the European market abuse rules |3 
Recital  29  provides  protection  to  merger  and  acquisition 
operations by excluding the notion that the communication 
of  inside  information  from  the  potential  target  to  the 
potential bidder represents a breach of confidentiality that 
triggers  a  disclosure  duty.  Recital  30,  which  has  been 
deemed applicable to takeover bids by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, excludes the bidder from having to 
disclose  inside  information  regarding  the  purpose  of 
launching a takeover.
9 If this was not the case, no takeover 
activity could indeed survive, given that once the intention 
to  launch a bid was announced, the target’s  market price 
would  immediately  increase  to  a  level  matching  the 
consideration  of  the  bid,  thus  making  the  acquisition 
impossible. The combination of recitals 29 and 30 therefore 
excludes information concerning the intention to launch a 
bid  from  falling  within  the  disclosure  obligations  of  the 
bidder. 
Both recitals should be reintroduced in the draft Regulation, 
possibly in Art. 6. 
3.  The  treatment  of  rumours  and  the 
definition of market manipulation 
Issuers rarely face, in practice, cases involving information 
that  can  be  classified  in  a  clear-cut  manner  as  “inside 
information to be published”, while a decision to publish is 
required in a very short timeframe. In many cases, before 
(the  issuer  realises  that)  an  obligation  to  disclose  inside 
information has arisen, rumours
10 spread in the market, in 
some cases causing sudden price variations. 
There is no clear rule either in the existing MAD framework 
or in the proposed framework on how issuers should behave 
when  rumours  addressing  their  securities  are  spreading.
11 
                                                                                                  
should not be deemed in itself to constitute the use of inside 
information”. 
9 See Moloney (2008), op. cit., pp. 959-960. 
10  Rumours  harm  market  confidence  and  increase  volatility, 
regardless of whether they are true or false. 
11 The third set of Level 3 guidance from the Committee of 
European  Securities  Regulators  (CESR),  with  non-binding 
value, states only that when the rumour relates to a piece of 
information  that  is  inside  information  within  the  issuer,  the 
latter  is  expected  to  react  and  respond  to  the  relevant 
publication  or  rumour  as  that  piece  of  information  is 
sufficiently precise to indicate that a leak of information has 
occurred (p. 9, CESR, Market Abuse Directive, Level 3 – Third 
set  of  CESR  guidance  and  information  on  the  common 
operation of the Directive to the market, CESR, Paris, 2008).  
This  is  the  simplest  case:  the  issuer  has  an  obligation  to 
comment on (true) rumours to the extent that their precision 
shows a leakage of inside information has occurred; rectius the 
issuer has to disclose the inside information that was possibly 
being  held  back  because  confidentiality  has  been  broken. 
Conversely,  “in  general,  other  than  in  exceptional 
circumstances  or  unless  requested  to  comment  by  the 
competent regulator pursuant to Art. 6(7) of MAD, issuers are 
under  no  obligation  to  respond  to  speculation  or  market 
rumours which are without substance”. Thus, issuers are under 
no obligation to respond to false rumours. CESR considers that 
this should also apply to publications, e.g. articles published in 
Member  states  adopt  different  approaches:  in  some 
countries there are ‘no comment’ provisions; in others, there 
is an obligation to comment only if rumours create abnormal 
movement in prices or quantities; in still others, only ‘true’ 
rumours must be commented upon. 
Uncertainty arises, especially because a sudden obligation to 
comment  may  result  in  the  disclosure  of  incomplete  or 
misleading  information  by  listed  companies.  Indeed, 
sending (or even attempting to send) “misleading signals” 
may result in a criminal violation.
12 The paradox is that, for 
an issuer, it is better not to disclose information than to risk 
the disclosure of misleading information. The net effect of 
the  proposed  MAD  framework  could  result  in  less 
information  available  to  investors,  with  implications  for 
efficient price formation. 
Given that listed  companies are traded  on  many  different 
European  platforms  and  market  manipulation  rules  are 
applicable to them, a common European framework would 
be welcomed. 
Listed companies should be obliged to comment only if two 
conditions apply: the rumour is true and there are abnormal 
movements in prices or quantities. Otherwise, ‘no comment’ 
policies should clearly be allowed. 
4.  Managers’ transactions 
With regard to managers’ transactions, the proposed higher 
threshold for disclosure obligations will significantly reduce 
trades without signalling  value. Yet it should be  clarified 
that every time the threshold is reached, the calculation of 
the  threshold  should  restart  from  zero  until  the  limit  has 
been reached again, to avoid insignificant  notifications to 
the  regulator.  Such  notification  should  be  sent  by  the 
relevant  people  or  companies  solely  to  the  competent 
authorities, which should decide the rules for public access. 
This would allow for the centralisation of information.
13 
The  deadline  for  the  communication  has  been  shortened 
(from  five  to  two  business  days).  This  may  create 
difficulties, in particular i) if the duty of communication to 
the  public  also  concerns  transactions  made  by  persons 
closely  associated  with  managers  and  which  are  being 
notified to the public by the latter; and ii) also considering 
that in many cases issuers notify transactions on behalf of 
managers. 
Maximum harmonisation is in any case necessary. 
                                                                                                  
the  press  or  Internet  postings,  which  are  not  result  of  the 
issuer’s initiative in relation to its disclosure obligations. The 
problem  is  that  issuers  often  face  true  rumours  that  are  not 
related to a complete piece of inside information but rather to 
confidential information or to a circumstance (not “a set of”) 
that is true (i.e. true rumours not necessarily stemming from a 
breach of confidentiality). 
12 Even if Art. 5 of the proposed Directive excludes Art. 4.1(d), 
which  deals  with  “dissemination  of  information  which  gives 
misleading signals”, the reference to 4(a) (“giving misleading 
signals”) may be taken into account by courts. 
13  A  similar  approach  was  taken  in  the  draft  Regulation  on 
short selling. 4 | Carmine Di Noia 
5.  Insiders’ lists 
With regard to insiders’ lists, their effective utility, at least 
in  relation  to  listed  companies,  has  been  questioned. 
Furthermore,  an  extension  of  the  notion  of  inside 
information may lead companies to incur relevant costs of 
compliance, especially in multinational listed companies. 
While the European Commission, in the consultation paper, 
reflected  on  the  possibility  of  re-examining  the  rules  in 
order to alleviate these burdens for issuers, it now proposes 
only to exempt issuers on SME growth markets. 
There  should  be  simplification  of  insiders’  lists  for  listed 
companies  or  at  least  for  all  SMEs,  wherever  traded 
(regulated markets or multilateral trading facilities, MTFs). 
6.  The extension of disclosure obligations to 
MTFs 
It  is  not  appropriate  to  extend  disclosure  obligations  to 
issuers whose shares are traded on demand only on ‘listing’ 
MTFs. The simplifications foreseen in the proposed market 
abuse  framework  (and  that  for  the  Markets  in  Financial 
Instruments Directive, MiFID) are not so relevant. 
Companies choose listing MTFs because the latter involve 
less  costly  rules  with  respect  to  regulated  markets. 
Intermediaries  and  investors  know  it  and  behave 
accordingly.  While  it  is  possible  to  extend  market  abuse 
rules  in  this  case,  imposing  disclosure  obligations  would 
limit the possibility for SMEs to raise capital. In any case, a 
possible  extension  of  the  disclosure  obligation  regime 
should be left to member states, with a voluntary application 
by MTFs. This would be easier in the event that a different 
notion  of  information  (Art.  12)  is  used.  Any  different 
solution could be detrimental for raising capital and could 
raise  the  costs  of  compliance  for  companies.
14
                                                        
14  A  scenario  for  the  financial  markets  that  would  be 
compatible with the set of Community rules would be a system 
of three steps: i) a regulated market ‘Basic’, dedicated to all 
listed companies with requirements in line with EU directives, 
with a simplified regime governing related party transactions 
and the voluntary adoption of a code of corporate governance; 
ii) a regulated market ‘Plus’ for voluntary membership by all 
companies,  large  or  SMEs,  characterised  by  very  strict 
discipline, even in terms of governance; and iii) an MTF for 
companies not listed on a regulated market, not accessible to 
the  retail  market  and  open  only  to  professional  investors 
(institutional  and  private  equity),  with  basic  requirements  of 
transparency. 
 
7.  Accepted market practices 
The draft Regulation removes the accepted market practices 
(AMPs),  which  shall  remain  applicable  12  months  after 
entry into application of the Regulation itself.  
The  proposed  removal  of  these  AMPs,  which  will  imply 
losing  the  benefits  of  operating  in  these  kinds  of  ‘safe 
harbours’,  should  be  reconsidered;  many  member  states 
recognised  some  AMPs
15  (and  some  of  them  have  many 
similarities). The European Commission, in its consultation 
paper of 2009, seemed to consider the opportunity to have 
greater  convergence  in  this  field,  instead  of  removal.  It 
would  be  appropriate  to  keep  them  and,  if  necessary,  to 
strengthen the ESMA coordination role in order to solve the 
problem  of  financial instruments traded in  more than  one 
jurisdiction.
16 
                                                        
15 Ten AMPs have been published on the ESMA website. 
16  As  envisaged  by  the  European  Commission  in its  Impact 
Assessment  accompanying  the  document  Proposal  for  a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
insider  dealing  market  manipulation  (market  abuse)  and the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the  Council  on  criminal  sanctions  for  insider  dealing  and 
market  manipulation,  SEC(2011)  1217  final,  Brussels,  20 
October 2011 (option 5.5.2, p. 175).  
 
About ECMI – European Capital Markets Institute 
ECMI is an independent non-profit organization created to provide a forum in which market participants, policy-
makers and academics alike can exchange ideas and opinions concerning the efficiency, stability, liquidity, integrity, 
fairness and competitiveness of European capital markets and discuss the latest market trends. 
These  exchanges  are  fuelled  by  the  publications ECMI  regularly  produces  for  its  members: quarterly  newsletters, 
annual reports, a statistical package, regular commentary and research papers, as well as occasional workshops and 
conferences. ECMI also advises European regulators on policy related matters, acts as a focal point for interaction 
between academic research, market sentiment and the policy-making process, and promotes a multidisciplinary and 
multidimensional approach to the subject. 
ECMI  is  managed  and  staffed  by  the  Centre  for  European  Policy  Studies  (CEPS)  in  Brussels.  Its  membership  is 
composed of private firms, regulatory authorities and university institutes. 
 
 
 
www.eurocapitalmarkets.org | info@eurocapitalmarkets.org 
Place du Congrès 1 | 1000 Brussels | Tel: + 32 2 229 39 11 | Fax: + 32 2 219 41 51 
 